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Si.de 1, Recorded November 29 , 1984, pag
e 1---Edward G. Lansdale 
L: Now this, i.s early in the morning 
for me at my greatly adva,nced age, 
s1.i1 ce 1908, that 1·s a long time. But 
I would like to talk to you a little 
bi.t and then shut up and let you ask so
me questions and so on, And I' think 
T will start with something in the Phi
lippines that has, has sc:,me echoes '· toda
:y 
in Nicaragua and El Salvador and over i
n the Soviet borders and several 
other places in the world. And had ech
oes in Viet Nam when I went there. 
But we had a fight against Communist g
uerillas just after World War II 
there, and I got involved with it, got 
involved with the man who became 
Secretary of National Defense over the
re, Ramon Magsaysay. And we licked 
the problem. The Communist guerillas h
ad a military leadership and their 
Chief of Staff or their active Command
er in the field, their combat man, 
had a fancy title; he was called the S
upremo. And the Huks Supremo was a 
country boy who had gone through high s
chool, but hadn't got much further. 
He had fought against the Japanese forc
es and then up against the Philippine 
forces, and was being very successful w
hen I came back there and try and help 
them in 1950. And we defeated him, he 
came in and surrendered and was 
eventually pardoned by the government, 
and is part of Marcos' government in 
the Philippines today. But in 1976 wh
en you were out at Leavenworth; I went 
out there to give a lecture, and the fa
culty and the student body out there 
were telling me, I just missed Luis Ta
ruc, had come over t o the United 
States and he had given a lecture, incl
uding how he beat me and how- I beat 
him over there. I'm sorry I missed tha
t; it would have fascinated me. I 
went after the students very hard to fi
nd out what he said. They didn't 
have it on tape. I wish they had taped
 it. But I would have really liked 
to have known the guy I was trying to d
efeat all the time and what worri_ed 
him and what made him happy and so fort
h, to give me some clues to what I did
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G. Lansdale 
L: right and what I did wrong. What I thought wa
s, h1?illiant might ha;ve been 
a stupid mistake, you know, and I had never caught o
n. It would have been a 
good education. But one of the students there wfien 
I was, talking and try±ng · 
to find out said that, he asked him, what was the on
e thing that made you folks 
fail , his guerillas. And he said, well, the Army or
 tfie go·veil'.'nment . , the 
Army started making it very difficult f0r us, at nigh
ti you never knew whe"l'.'e 
they were. They would keep coming after us all the 
time. S-0 we finally· jus•t 
g0t worn out and had to give up. Well, my own .. ,I d
on 1't think he thought 
deeply enough about why or how we had defeated him. 
But I thought mys-elf 
in the thing that we took the revolution away from th
ese people, who were 
trying to have a revolution. They were fighting wha
t they called a. peoples'.'t 
war, and we took the people away from them, And we 
were very success,ful 
in stopping them. Today, oddly enough, there is a ne
w- Communist guerilla. 
force in the Phil;i.ppines, they call the New Peoples:t 
Army, and · someo:l,' tfie;i.);' 
leaders:, they are mostly city boys from the state un
iversity, the Uni've!t:'s·i::ty, 
of the Philippines, and they are much like you: the
y nave gone up into tfie 
hills to fight against the government and against Ma
rcos and push a. program 
of their own, But the only thing that makes me hope
ful , all these youngs.ters 
feel that they are ten times, as smart as the old Huk
s were and they are doing 
the same things, and I ... I hope somebody on the gov
ernment's side remembers) 
what, .. what we did in the old days and it will come 
back to them and maybe 
it will do it. So far the Philippine Army, unfortun
ately, ;i:.s· behaving the way-, 
we did in Viet Nam, and that's wrong. You don't run
 guerilla wars out there, 
They are behaving the way we are teaching others· in 
Salvador and other- places·, 
r-tm afraid we're giving the wrong advice to the Nica
raguans: who are in 
0ppos·ition to the Contras there (.illegible) to the 5
andinistas . We don it 
,, 
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L: understand revolution, and yet we are a country th.at was bern in a 
rev0lution, So we all are antecedents of revolutionarie.s·, and if we w0uld 
ever s·top and th.ink a little bit about where we come from and what we know· 
ins·tinctively in our veins and in the family and so forth and going back in 
history and reading a little bit, why it would start coming clearer on wnat 
could be the strength that we could make use of. In the Philippines-, I came 
back in 1950 after r had been there ... I left there in t4g and was asked back 
by the President of the Philippines to help their intelligence, the Philippine 
military intelligence get good against the Huks, I discovered.,.principa,lly, 
he had asked for help because he never knew when they were going to a,tta,ck 
where 
the palace/ he was staying, and he would have armoured cars· up ••• outsi:de of · 
his· bedroom to protect him and beat off enemy attacks, They- never got that 
far, but he was afraid of that. And maybe Taruc was thinking, you know·.;. 
he was in the. same position up in the mountains when the Army ca,me a,gai.ns·t 
him . But the military were misbehaving. The main purpose, · they tfiemght, 
c,f the guy with a gun was to go out and shoot people. Now people meant · Uie:· 
enemy and anybody standing next to the enemy and anybody tha_t wa.s .in the 
neighborhood and that meant villagers and the people in the,.,a,nd tfie. :Huks 
were foll0wing Mao's dictum of getting close to the people and d<Dinq political 
work, getting the people to support them, and when the troops would go out and 
misbehave a,r0und villagers, the Communist guerillas· would sa,y, s:ee, thqt 1·s· 
•• , they aren t t y0ur friends; they are enemies· of all of us·, a,nd we• 11 help 
,, 
you; the only way to get ahead in this· world is t© join us· and pi:cR:-up a rifle~· 
too, and we'll kill the. enemy. And I talked to people cominq in by nus ;f;rcmr:i 
the prov.t.nce.s into a place like Mani le\. They s·a,id there would be checkpoints· 
manned hy troops: a.long the hi_ghway. And r remember the da,ughte.;l'.' o;f; the. Col6nel · 
S':i::de 1 , Reco;t:"ded November 2 9, 1984, p&ge 4---Edwa;t:"d G. Lans<la,le 
L: who was, the G-2 of the Philippine Armv, was telling me ,. , she, said, 
she wa.s crying, she s-aid, these troops got all the passengers off a,nd 
s,tarted checking them, and they beat up on two ki.ds tha.t were cm the bus 
with her, friends of hers·, and she said , it's terrible, And I S'il.i.d, wnat 
did they do? She said, well, they di.dn I t move fas·t enou<?Jh, The tr00ps· 
wanted them off the bus· fast t0 be searched and they jus:t we.ren '' t mQ-ving 
fast enough. So this was. a military that e s s entially· saw themselves a.s 
hein('f apart f~ ·the people. Well, one of the things· that we d±d was· to 
move tne troops in closer t0 the people. We sta.rted with dis:eipl.;r:ne, · hut 
also when .. . in getting them to act in ways to help the. pe0ple., we started 
something called Civic Action, which is part of the u~s. Army i:i,nd u.s ~ 
military operations now. That was really a device· that we, used in the 
Philippines. I invented the name, •• I had to teach what tci do a,nd they 
said, what do you call it? So I started thinking a name up witk tliat na;me 
as an activity, that the troops would do. And it's a.mazing now· to see it 
in all the U.S. forces which this was meant originally for the PfliJippine 
fo'l'.'ces. But we also extended that a great deal and got the Army in helping 
the farmers go to Peoples' Court to fight land claims. In the, past, tena,nt 
farmers had had a lot 0f tremble going up against landlo~ds, who would cmme 
to these Courts with their lawyers and outtalk the poor farme'.l'..' 1 who would 
s:ta,nd there with their hat i .n their hand trying to get some justice for his• 
claims, and never ·understand what the lawyers were arguing about , jus-t get 
beaten down hy it. So our Judge Advocate in the Philippine Army got his 
Judge Advoccite lawyers to go to these Peoples' Courts and be the free. ccmnsel 
of farmers· cases·. And we started changing the outlook of the government towards 
the pe0ple, so much_ so that eventually we got i .nto running decent elections, 
Side 1, Rec0!!'.'ded N0vemher 29, 1984, page 5---Edward G. Lansdale 
L: That was another thing that a recruiting drive on the Communist s-ide 
was· that the government cheated in the last election and hadn~t.,.had roh5ed 
the people of their vote. So the Communists· had a slogan of ooycotting 
elections, that you couldn •·t win an election and that y0u didn ~t get your 
'ffian to win. And I remember going up country and seeing a friend of mine 
who was in the last election , and I said, is it true that they are cfieatingf 
And hes-aid, well, I'll put it this way, he said , they either robbed me 
of my vote last time or my poor old mother; he said, I was running for as-eat 
and we both voted, but they only gave me one vote. And he. sa,:;i:.d, l: know· l;~d 
vote for myself, I did that, but r•m sure my old, my pe0r old gray-haired 
·m0ther would vote for me, too. They wouldn • t give her a v(;)te, :so I: guess· 
he cheated, see. But this is the feeling in the, . , throughQut · the Philippines~\ 
So we used the Army to backstop the Commis:si0n on Elections and ·make sure 
that there was a decent , honest election . And that was in 1951 in the bye 
electicm. And the President of the Philippines, Quirino, was i .n Sp9,in 
visiting when we did that and came back just the day before elections·, and 
he. trim to change everything . I was in the Chief of Staff 1' s office and he 
got some direct order • . . he stood at attention at his· desk there and sa):d, 
yes , sir, no sir, and I knew either God was talking to him.or the. Pres-ident 
and the President was trying to get him to move troops out of some precincts· 
in critical districts, and he didn't do it . And he said, no sir, the Commiss-±on 
on Elections asked me to do that and I ' m going to go ahead and do that, and 
itts legal and it's the right thing for the Army to do. And so when he hung 
up , he said, that was .. ,I said, I know, congratulations; I shook his· hand, 
r said you did the right thing. He said, can I get a job tomorrow-. The 
P:r;es.-:j;dent will probably kick me out as Chief of Sta,f'f. And J: said, yeah., 
d ,f 
y-o.u Hl ha;ve a jQ>h, and you tll have a place in tnis, country,. . Well , an amazing 
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L: thing happened: the opposition won. The c:andia-a:t:e·s -won in all the 
places-, so it obviously wasn ' t the government cheating of tfie administrati~n, 
the in 1's cheating, but the eiut '' s had gotten a chance and a decent .•• the people 
gave the credit to the Army of giving their government back to them again , 
and it suddenly became a geivernment of the p eople, by the people, for the 
people again. And the Communists were trying t(1) get the peop le to go agaj::n~:t 
'l 
the government, and the Army and the people said , that ''s - our g0vernment , you 
know, and we 're not going to do it (illegible phrase}. But the funnies-t 
thing that happened, I went up right after election day, the next day , up 
H 
into the •.. where the Huk country is, was the mo~-t figh:tj:ng in Cent;l'.'a,l Luzon ; 
·up em P0mpanga at this· point, and when a convoy was stopped with. troops-~ 
they would get down to relieve themselves- from the trucks, and so.me 0:f; them 
would still be up there manning machine guns and so forth., keeping an eye out 
as guard for the train on the · thing, and the men would stand over to the side 
of the road and upzip their pants and so forth as the usual type of thing, 
and this was near a village. And I saw this convoy stopped and the men hop 
off, and the villagers saw them and all of a sudden the troops, wer e the her oes-; 
they didntt know it at that time . And these guys were all standing there and 
then they got embarassed; all the girls and the wc,men from the village came 
running cmt and hugged them and kissed them and so forth and they were jiggling 
arcmnd like this .... and I got .... we've got it made from here on , it '' s clear 
sailing. We've g0t a victory in the making. And this sort of thing is- wha,t l' 
wished TaTuc w0uld have e .xplained, because we turned tnem from t 51 , that 
electicm , we turned around, the Huks ha,d to leave off all their usual haunts 
and they., , we drove them back into remote a,reas- up in tne. mounta,ins- and went 
a fter them ther-e, qnd j ust kept on going , And that's' when it beca,me h a.rd , 
s~eeping at nights fo r them and s o on. But the real victor y took place in a 
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L: way that was.nit -military at all. There were three or four Filipinos· 
wfi0 were working clcsely together in there, and they came over to Viet Nam 
later when I went over there and were helping me there and trying to help 
the Vietnamese Army do this· thing, but the Vietnamese 'A y had been trained 
by the French and, • . in a modern, western Army way 0f fight..tng guerillas·, and 
I don 1·t think that they ever learned how to fight the guerillas· that tney 
were up against, They tried very hard; some of them knew, a few 0f them, 
and some of the Americans knew over there and they had gotten experience, hut 
it used to break our heart everyday to see what would happen and the -mistakes· 
made and the things going wrong. But I was very fortunate in being included 
into a spot where I had to learn, and fortunately there wa.sntt a lot of attention 
being put on it so there wasntt a journalist with space in American pape'l:'s 
looking over my shoulder all the time, and to say, 0h, dcm't d0 tnat 0;1; ·w:r1a,t 
a stupid move that is and so forth. So we could make -mistakes, anddci lSette(l:1 
next time and so forth and teach ourselves what ~s- happening. And it '-s· cme 
of the few wins our side ever had. The British. and Malayans won out B:r;i.;tti::sn 
and Malaya used to come over to see the great things that we were doing, and · 
it surprised me that the little things we used to do in Viet Nam w0uld be 
all over Asia and down in Malaya where the British were fighting and China 
and Japan would start getting inquiries about it. The war was· goi::ng on in 
Korea and, thank God, that kept all the military brass and everything locking 
at Korea and not at what we were doing. And it also made them deny us equip~ 
ment, and the Philippine Army would have a Christmas catalog sort of, of U.S\ 
equipment to ask for; the Navy would always ask for a submarine, you know, 
you need a submarine against guerilla forces up in the mounta,.:j:ns·, you know·, 
that's great stuff, We would have to say no and we ha,d to d()) it on the. cneek 
and on our own and with. our own wits, much as· the wa,y that the guerillas did, 
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L: And it worked. we had, going down to fundamentals· and principles that 
~eally werked. Well, listen, l was just going to talk for a moment s0 . .,when 
I sta'l'.'t, I' can 1· t s·top. So r' 11 stop for a minute and see if you have got 
questions and so forth that I can answer. Yeah? 
Q: When you were talking, you said that we made mis:takesO, you · Rn~w~ in 
dea,Hng with ..• 
L: Please list them .• ,I'rn not going to. 
Q: Well, what could we have done right, not list them, but what were some' 
of the things that .. .. 
L: Oh, I see, I see. Well, let me tell you one thing tfia,t ... we ane . a, 
technical nation, and we love our equipment. When you are commandtng men 
and particularly in the Army and in the Infantry, you ty;y t0 use your equip~ 
ment to cut down your losses, you are commanding, and you a,'l'.'ever;y 9,pt to us~ · 
your high power weapons, artillery, and keep the enemy at a distance and 
punish them. So one of the things is, you get in where. you start •. , letts? 
say you are going along a road and you start getting to some weapons'' fire 
on your convoy or your troops walking along the r0ad. The commander's f irs:t 
thought is to get some weapons against that fire right away and if he has 
artillery, he's going to use it. Now, we used to do that in Viet Nam, use 
artillery, and then finally we got to :really harassing fire against locati'0ns, 
and not knowing the targets, but just picking places and firing at will, The 
enemy would go and ... he had a form of psychological judo. He would g0 into 
a village and teach the people how to make slit trendies under thei;i:? beds· 
or next to their shacks and so for;th., and teach. them that we were their 
enemies. We'd be walking along the road, the Americans· and the ,Vietnwnese 
Army were going to try· to kill thes·e people, So when that happens-, get down 
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L: in these slit trenches and get ycmr children there and try, and sta,y· sa,-1:e 
until the firing is over. With that, they would wait until the troops wer e 
going along the road nearby the village and open fire on them. Well trie 
villagers couldn't go out and say, gee, these are five guys that came in last 
night; they don• t belong here and so forth.; they aren • t part 0f us·, A,nd tliey 
couldn ~t s-top them, b.ut here on the road ins.tead of going and sending troc;,ps, 
in to find out what was really going on, y0u open up with artillery·, and wliat 
you 1'-ve done, you I ve made a whole bunch of pe0ple, hundreds, of people hate 
ycm and be afraid of you, that you are the enemy. You try and kill innocent 
people, including children, by staying at a distance and firing, r remember 
a very fine U.S. Army officer I first met down in Indonesia, and lie was· an 
Attache there, an Army Attache, but he was very close to some of the I:ndqne::;i;a,n · 
Army leaders, and I thought, gee, what an unusual guy he was, He went int© 
one of the General' s houses and the General• s kids· saw· him I and here wa,s· a bi_g, 
tall American, they were climbing up him like he was a hill o'l'.' sometliing 1 
when he came to the door and hugging and everything. He was really· welcome · 
in this· house. And he introduced me to most of the top brass· in the rndonesi.an 
Army and r got a lot accomplished in a couple of hours, more than 'I!lany· days· of 
work otherwise, just because of his introductions. But he came up t()) Viet Nam 
and was given a command, given one star in Viet Nam, and commanded a brigade 
that was just outside of Saigon. And during the Tet offensive he went in and 
covered one district that my team and I had worked with the people livtng tn 
the dist'l'.'ict to take them away from politically supporting the other s±de and 
" 
coming over to our side. And it was a poor, working clas·s neighborhood, Well , 
some of the enemy had gotten into thie neighborhood, District 8 0f saigQn ·ana 
so on, and he was· sent in to clean up the enemy·, District B, · a few: o;f them were 
'' 
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L: The people in District 8, he didn ' t know that they- were very- loyal t0 our 
s-ide, came up and tried to explain to the Americans that there a r e a f ew- of . the 
enemy in here; we will show· you where they are.,.and they told it .• ,t0ld him. and 
his· men that . And he didn't believe them. He said that was a sc'l':'awny l0oking 
place and everything, so he brought in artillery and blasted all these houses 
down. Well, we had spent two years teaching these people , you can have a 
start in life. we gave them some places out in the mud flats· outs-±.de of · town 
along the river. And we taught them how to dry mud ny (illigible)it up and 
letting it dry out in the sun and building foundations·, and building thei r 
own shacks there. So whether the shacks looked awful or not, they were a ll 
these people had and they were proud that they had gotten a little ahead where 
they were. And then we started a lot of self- ... cottage indus·tries in tfiere 
and let them start earning some money on their own. They were getting som.e 
pride. And when the enemy had come in before that, a lot of them were relatives 
or sons or friends of theirs; these people used to yell at them to quit; you•re 
en the wrong side, come on over and be with us, come home. And the enemy was· 
afraid to let the troops ever to come close, except during the Tet offens-ive 
they· were supposed to take the city of Saigon, and they came in to do it. And 
there were just a couple of them who were strangers really to these people, 
were in the hous·e, and the American artillery destroyed all these houses . Well 1 
during the fighting, I sent my team down there to see what help we c~uld get , 
and the people told my folks who had worked with them very closely, t0 never 
show up again. They hated Americans, all Americans , from then ·on. And -my 
team came back and they were trying to report to me, and they wer e c r ying, 
These were grown men, you know, and they'd worked two years getting these 
people to the place .,. a.nd I went down to a meeting f r om that and wes~mo;reland 
SIDE 2 
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L: was, in it, it was an Ambassadors' meeting, a countr
y team meeting, and 
Westie was: telling how his forces were pushing the enemy 
out, •. , and you 1·ve 
loused up one district, you know, and I'm just going to s
peak -up fat!'.? the 
people there. You are doing it wrong. And Ambassador Bu
nker said, I' don 1·t 
know whether you ought to speak right now. Looking at yo
ur picture, so damn 
mad, you know, you are red in the face and youtre yelling
 a.t him. You ' really 
want to yell at somebody in this meeting? I said, yeah-, ·
 I got to get it out · 
of my system. So I did. And later on I saw this: Bi!;igad
eer who · wa,s, cornma.nd:i::,n9 
there, whom I had known down in Indonesia. I was up on t
he· Hill tes•t.i'•f'.ying 
for the Senate and he was in for the same hearing. And I
 came i _n and Fie 
was talking with senators and saw me, and he just stopped
 talking, a,nd he 
leaned over, and he said, yeah, I owe y0u cme geod kick i
n the pants, fox., ',meet 
He sald, I did the wrong thing there in Dist't'ict 8, And 
he sa,.id, I' he·iu::,d fiOW,' 
-madr you got at General Westmoreland and all the Army for
 doing- the · W'J'.iGng thing , 
He said, go ahead and kick me. I said, no, I can't do it
 in front · of the 
Senate, ycm know, like this. And then the Senator said, 
what is all tfiis~ • . 
what sort of jokes do you military men have among yoursel
ves? I said, well, 
this is a very personal war for some of us, ycm know, we 
got involved in ±t. 
I hope I' answered the question. I had my ... way around th
e hill on the thing. 
Yeah? 
Q: Can you tell me what happened to the Taylor report in 1961? 
L: Uh, I don't know. I went over it with Taylor and w
hen I came back, Taylor 
wanted us to all go in and talk with President Kennedy. 
He said that pr,esident 
Kennedy wanted •... 
Well, ·my daughters· at home will want to hear about this me
eting in the Oval 
O:ff i _ce, so he promptly g t in the rocking chair and was g
oing back and forth. 
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L: And Pres·ident Kennedy came in and he tried to get out of his· r0cking 
chair and it caught him in the hips and he was bringing the wfiele chair up , 
s0 he flad to pull the chair loose and let the Pres·ident come in and sit down, 
But , he asked us to finish up the report, and there were reconnnendations- that 
·Rostow and Taylor were going to work on further, and so were the rest of us. 
Rut Kennedy asked me to get apart from the others and wait, that he wanted 
to say something to me. So what it was, he wanted '.Ille to go to work on some 
Cuban problems: and had nothing to do with Viet Nam. And I ~m sor'l'.'y I : ever 
got mixed up in those Cuban things. I've been highly critical about the Bay 
of Pigs and the way the U.S. had gone about things, and I tried to introduce 
some revolutiemary tactics· there, but the U.S. had in mind command0 raids· 
for Cuba and had never gotten it out of their heads that that wa,s· the way, to 
fight a revolution, was through a commando raid, I couldn~t disabuse them of 
that, But they had forgotten the American Revolution and how revoluti'Qns• 
are fought psychologically and with political input. So I wasn 1· t very succes.ful. 
Yeah? 
~-:· Who was it that usually ... like in the Cubans ... who was it wanted the 
commando raids? Was it the military or was it the .. . 
L: No, the military was by and large critical of the raid there at the Bay 
of Pigs, and yet the Joint Chiefs had been in on it, and one section of the 
J0int Chiefs,.,and afterward in the review, they were trying to determine 
what happened. And they were sure that somebody in that bui1cil.ii.gg, and they 
would look:. at me as· if, somebody you know, and I said, my friends, I got out 
of the country when this thing was formed for a reason. I knew that the thing 
was going to fail, you were going to turn around, you were the guys with egg 
on your face and you were going to wipe it off and say somebody else has egg 
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L: em their face and you are going to point to me, and I wasn't even pres~mt. 
I got tne. hell out of here, I went to Viet Nam. And I wrote a report and 
I 
tn 
1·60, early •61 when the whole thing was planned, and .insisted on bringing in 
the Joint Staff and the Joint Staff section to be the military· input~n the 
thing. And they didn•t catch on themselves that they didntt have en0ugh to 
run a, a, really an amphibious operation. It was too little, I:t was- t00 
ambitious for CIA to do. Now there were s0me military· men in CTA whose idea, 
it was, but none of them were experienced in amphibian 0perations·, and initia,lly 
there was a thought of doing what Castro had done, was· go up in the hills 
and get s0me of the people , including those that had been with Castro, to 
fight the Castro government. And that I went with. And as soem · as they s-ta1::ted 
talking an across the beach operation and holding ground as they hit the. 
beaches and so forth, I said, you can't do that in a ceuntry· where the. Army· 
and everything is as alert as they are there, and we are going to get clobDe;i:;ed, 
And they got me out of those meetings. They said, please don I t talk that way·. 
This· is· a policy meeting. I said, well, in policy meetings· yon have got to 
get very honest, and you should have talk. And incidentally, that isn 1-t 
allowed; you can't talk very plainly. I'll change the subject a little ~nd 
give you a comment right now. And please don't ever quote me em tliis. But 
I thought it a very strange thing .•. I was an Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense, and appointed, and the only military man who was·, And used ten 
watch. the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs talk in the Pentagon and t~ 
each other, and then see them up before the President. And when Viet Nam was, 
developing and everything, they would talk very big in the :Pentag<m and tfien 
usually the Chairman would go up and talk with the President and sem1e of · the 
National Security Council people or in Cabinet meetings, and usually when he 
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L: got up there, the President would say something and the Chie£ cf Staff 
. h ~ 1· would say·, yes:, sir, or n0, sir, 1.f he wanted a n0. And e was, ,very· po ;tte 
and c0rrect. And then he would go back and he would rep0rt t0 the . other 
Chiefs, this is what the President wants, he wants us· to do. And they said, well 
Chief didn't you tell him this, that we had discussed before a.nd everything. 
I did hut this is his decision he made. Well, he didn '' t ever say. , , you know) 
well, we considered this and here's some things t0 think of. And it used t~ 
get the:rn because when I'd be present at some of these meetings and tlie 
President would ask me and I'd tell him point blank, And they·1'd c0me to me 
in great shock; you said no to the President; you said that c0uldn•t be done 
and so forth. I said, this is what any citizen has to do when he gets- up to 
the top guy, he needs ... he's not an expert on this., he figures that I: am 0r 
at least have some knowledge of it, and this is the time to be honest, before 
people go cmt and get killed and so forth trying t0 do the right thing for the 
United States. And I never understood ... some of those people, when r taJk that 
way, guys would think I'm a hot air artist and everything, but I did things· 
like that that shocked them apparently. And they were trying to explain away 
·my attitudes and so forth, that weren't normal. But I hope and t'l;ust that 
when you get, later in life when you get up to positions where you are called 
in by the top brass and so forth, whether it's civilian or military, that you 
will be honest yourself . You have yourself to live with and you don 1·t have to 
live with all those other peop le, But your own inside feelings and everything 
are the. thing that you have to live with easily, and I urge that you tell the 
tlmth, too, at that time. Well, got another question? 
Q: Why didn I t you have the same control over the Viet Nam si.tuatiQn as·. , . 
Philippines ... (illegible) 
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L: I did 0riginally. I was ... and not quite as much but almost~ that 1's · a / 
good question, incidentally. It I s one that gives me nightn),tr es- once in awhile, 
and I' wake up and worry about it. Initially the 'French were pulling out 0f · 
Viet Nam. They had been defeated at Dien Bien Phu and had accepted defeat 
at Geneva, and we finally got a French--A:rnerican military 1nission put together 
in Viet Nam, working with the Vietnamese Army; it was called FRIEND. And I' 
had the pacification division of that group: Army, Navy, Air Force in 
pacification divisions. And each of the divisions had a chief officer of 
one nation and an executive of the other nation, so I was Chief of the 
pacification division. I had a French Colonel as my Executive, and then 
our staff was in both nations. But we, we got the Vietnamese Army- to star t 
behaving themselves and doing very, very well, and I thought that they were 
really learning how to do it. They were very reluctant to do such . things> as 
civic action to behave themselves, to even drive the roads· carefully-. We 
gave ... we had contests, driving contests for the Vietnamese Army, I remember 
before one of our operations we had a big ceremony and awarded the.,.gave 
se>me awards to the best drivers. And they met in the town plaza and the. 
military band was there and played and the troops came up and g0t thei); 
decerations, got back into their trucks. And a great mob of the locals·, 
villagers, had gotten there, and they took off, right through. these mobs·, 
and kids were yelling, the women were grabbing chicks· and everything up out 
ef the way, and they broke all the rules ef safe driving with the new· medals•, 
I Am The Best Driver In The Outfit, on and going right through ,,, and so tlie 
lessons I don~t think were ever really learned but. ,, it was· great fun -getting 
a medal, but when they got them, went right on •.. , .. but , .. and in se:,me of: 0ur 
n.ig pacification opercttions the behavior of the t r oops· changed and they,,, they· 
lear ned themsekves what.,,one of them was up in central Viet Nam , the lctst 
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L: big one, and they ... the ... under the Geneva Accords: the enemy was with-
drawing to the rnz,rth_ through a port of embarkation, while we wel'.:e try±ng to 
take over the area that they were getting ou.t of, And the troQlp commandeJ'." 
believed very much in what we were trying to do and he, insisting on the 
troops ooeying • •. and so initially they were doing it under the orders, under 
the duress, of their officers forcing them to .... get int<:> it and ask t 0 rebuild 
a market place or the public buildings were down and so forth or a bridge 
would be broken and they'd, put temporary repair. And the enemy in retreating 
were telling the people about the Vietnamese Army and describing them; they 
came in and ate little children for breakfast and so forth; terrible pe0ple 
and watch out for them, they rape all the girls , and so trying to get them 
very much against the , Army. But the word of what the Army was doing and how.-
it was behaving and trying to help the people got out ahead of the l\rmy, and by-
the second day of the operation, the people in these towns were coming out and 
greeting the Vietnamese Army. After the ... then it was the Viet Minh 
for the Communist forces left to go down to their port of embarkatio n and our -
side came along , the people were out bringing water to the troops, throwing 
flowers for them; they were heroes to the people. And these guys liked playing 
the her o, you know, so about the second and third day they were all saying , 
hey, that building over there needs some help, you know, and asking their 
captain's permission or their lieutenant to go over and work on things and 
everything. And by the .•. it took roughly ten days to the port of embarkation, 
and the .. ,by the time the Communists got down there to go aboard Polish liberty 
ships,, which_ were U.S. made and they had never been painted and everything by-
the Communists p,nd were rus:ty old hulks there, to go nor th. But the Communist 
l 
tro0ps going aboard were trying to kidnap the younger people,, the, 12 years, o ld , 
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L: 13 and 14 year olds, to go north and be trained by them to be infiltrators· 
later back down south. And the people were throwing rocks at them and hated 
tfiem. And they said, get out of here. And the, • . they we!t'e tupnin9" a,!l'.louna and 
bucking the Philippine Army coming in because they behaved so well , And all 
their propoganda and everything just failed them. And I remembe•F I baa a wan 
with the forces down ... I sent one adviser in, a First Lt , 1 were 
roughly two divisions, troops in an operation, and he stayed withtheComri)anaer 
and he and the Commander were close friends and everyoody t00k that very amiss:, 
I remember General O'Daniel saying, do you think that's; enough? And J' sa±.a , 
the Commander, the Vietnamese Commander, listens to them~ the¥ are close 
friends-, they are sharing a tent together on this march. Ana I saia , you 
don't need more than one guy get in the place and that's go0d enough , · And · 
r •m in touch with him by radio everyday all along, time of the day·, But he 
let me know about the people throwing rocks at the C0mmunist troops·. Sc :t 
went up to see Ngo Dinh Diem, who was the Chief of State at that time , and I 
said, why don't you go on up there (illigible) was wher e they were going 
out. I said, you go up there and after the Communists leave, just reestablish_ · 
your government up there. And he said, well, should T.? I hear the Communists· 
have turned the people against us. I said, no, just the reverse is happening , 
Theyare thr0wing rocks at them, the Communist troops leaving. And the French. 
were v ery critical of Diem and very critical of me and so forth, Bu.t I ' talked 
them into getting some of their top French military brass and some of the Paris 
mass correspondents and some of the other correspondents from metropolitan 
F:t'ance to go up there and witness it. And Diem wanted me t {';l go. I: said , no, 
we s-houldntt have a lot of ,Americans ar0und this, It is· up to you and let the 
'.F':r;ench witness ·Vietnamese running Vietnamese affairs-, So he went up ther e I a.nd 
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L: I have pictures at home of this: the Vietnamese crowded around this-
Ngo Dinh Diem,_ wh0m we had said was a remote, mandarin type of a guy, a little 
roly-p<"ly guy, and they lifted him up on their sh0ulders and were ca,r'l7ying him 
around, and I can see ..• this picture, all these people and men and w@men the~e 
and the mob are cheering this guy and with great big happy smiles- on thei.r 
faces as- they are doing it. And the French came back. This French. General 
saw him and he said, I am one of the guys that used t0 say- they made a terrible 
mistake ever putting Diem in to run this country, but he said going up and seeing 
this·, he said, I wouldn't have believed it unless I'd seen it with my 0wn eyes,, 
And later on when the Americans started talking so against Diem, I 1'd sn0w- them 
this- picture: do you recognize him? They'd say, that's- Diem, r 1·d say, yea,h.,, 
these are the people you say hate him and everything; look at their faces and 
you can just see on this, And we'd never handled it correctly,., 
C: Let•s take a ten minute break. 
Q: ... and also, why does the U.S. continue to buy oil (illegible}, ,, 
L: Ah, boy, that's a double edged question. Would you like to answer · it? 
Q: r know what my opinion is. I want to hear what yours is, 
L: Yeah. Uh, I don't know how large a net he has- of terrorists·, out · I' douo.t 
that it ts that organized, and maybe he himself would 1·t know, I know. that he, 
he is the type who funds such things. He's got a tremendous ego and gets 
enthusiasm for doing this, and a person like that isn't always- keeping track oi; 
his (?)wn actions and so forth , which I suspect, he isn't. He's listening to 
voices, give approval, whether these terrorists (J:lligiblel say, yes-, 
b0s-s, r-•11 go do it, or the aides around him saying, that ts a smart ·m0ve tha.t 
you just made and so forth. That's what he's paying attention to really, and 
s-alving his own ego on the thing. Why we do business ,. I don i t know, We shoot 
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L: dewn his aircraft and say, you 're a good business-man, we 
do business 
with ... I don't know what the rationale is for such a thing, I 
like a world 
s-impler tnan the one we live in. I like rules simpler, If you 
are against 
somebody and want them to stop, why not be an enemy and stop him
, or at le~st 
get him out of doing wrong and so forth and believe in a thing 
strongly en0ugli. · 
to do so. I can't really answer you. Yeah? 
Q: I wonder if you could go over how this Phoenix program ev
alved. In 
your opinion (.illegible) ..• successful? 
L: Yeah. The Phoenix program was essentially Bill Colby's a
nd Bill Colny-
was the CIA Station Chief in Viet Nam for quite a time, and late
r came back · 
in pacification and took it up again. And it was later on that 
the Phoenix 
program was really, was most effective when he came back again. 
Rut hi:;,, 
thought was· that he was looking at the political structure of th
e 'Vietn~ese 
Communists, and he was quite correct in wanting to counter that~
 And he, wa,s" 
trying to set up a program to encourage the Vietnamese people to
 go out and 
get after the political leadership s:m the other side, which is· o
ut i _n the 
villages· very hard for police or government officials or Vietnam
ese milita,'.l;'y· 
to ever catch on who these guys were. They looked just like the
 other citizens-
t0 them. Cilligible) ~ p.ut a p't':t_ce. on tlie fiec1,d Q:f; the ,, of · tfie:se · 
people and encouraged people to start weeding them out. New, h
e wasn '·t out 
after just killing off all the other people. He has been highly
 criticized 
fer his Phoenix program, for trying to set up a program to turn 
the Vietnamese 
against each other and just kill off a lot of people. And the c
ritics say, 
he was getting people that had grudges against the , each. other 
in the v illages 
t0 give them a license to go out and kill somebody that they did
n~t like, in 
a pe't'sonal, feud· type of thing. It wasn tt that, It was·,,, ended
 up with --m0st 
of the P'?li tka_l cadre who kept the enemy really going in the pe
oples war i _n 
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L: Stmth Viet Nam, getting shot. There was some cadre with the troops-, wno 
were political cadre, but they were responsible to the Politbur<':) in Han(')i and 
were part 0f the military chain 0f command, were di f fe'l'.'ent from the · politi:ca,l 
cadre in the villages. And it was a ... he was· fighting a real war in the 
Phoenix program. My feel on the thing was that it was toa> A;merica.ne l :t Wt1;sn 't 
Vietnamese enough. The Vietnamese have a distrust of foreigners, very violent · 
in the French days·, but the Communists were fighting the French, but most 0:t" 
the pe0ple were against the French themselves. So it was- very lemelyt0 l:'iea 
'Frenchman out in Viet Nam. The Americans came in, we were round eyes·, we 
looked differently from the people. They didn't trust us, nor did they, t,rus-t 
officials from a distant city, out in the villages. It was a fear of foreigners 
that was at work. And when we put in programs, which we did "Ill.any- 0f · our pro-.,:-. ' 
grams were made by Americans and sold to the Vietnamese t0 do, nut with. Ameri:ca,ns-
supervising or advising and furnishing the funds and so forth, keepin9them 
going, And Phoenix was one of those. So when the Americans left ,, the p.rogram · 
ended, And the Americans that ran that never understood that all the good that 
they did was good up until they took a plane to go home again: boom, it ended 
like that. And when we got out of Viet Nam, our forces and our people, support 
groups and everything, many of the programs that we were pushing just either 
stopped or weren't done correctly or the Vietnamese lost interest and didn't 
do it; they worked their own; these were the things that the Americanswanted 
and they weren 1·t being d0ne for the Vietnamese own good, They didn ~t .•. they 
do now, after the defeat there in Viet Nam, some of them are taking a look back 
t0 see what happened. And sl':}me €lf them who are friends· of mine come in and say, 
gee, what happened, I didn't know you guys were as confused as we were, you know. 
W'e went heme as vict~r~ and left you there to get a licking, and those are hard 
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L: words for them to take, but it's the truth. And we ought to be ashamed 
of oursel,ves· for what we did to them, but of; course we can '·t really· be b.ecaus:e 
/ 
the Americans at home were afflicted too on 
were splitting because we didntt understand the 
this thing, az we as· a na,tion 
nature of the conflict tha,t 
. ' Ii 
we were in. I think cmr government made a ,mistake in not · tea,chi'pg · a. li·ttle 1 · , 
I H i 
explain to the people why we were there and what we were t rying · to d0 , ' a,n0 · we · 
\\ 
·may be doing less than we ever did. I wish we 1d done · later what I used to do 
we~d have a pr0blem, I'd send an adviser to be with the Vietnamese and do it 
and say, let them do it, and if they make ·mistakes-, they- might lea,it['n by- it, 
and get close enough to them so they'll admit their mistakes· ana. •we i::an •ta,lk 
about it. And we used to do that, but instead the military would ha;ve a,dv±sers> 
at all levels, so many advisers- that all the orders· given would have to be · 
tra.nslated into Vietnamese and everything, and they were American orders, And 
now· do y0u expect men to go out and f /4ht and die fo r a bunch. of · fo't'eigneI;S· 
in their own country against their own people. They kneW-:we were sort ot · right 
on the things that we said and they wanted to do the right things·, nut we were 
foreigners and in a country where foreigners are those dirty guy~- tha,t ygu neve;J;' 
listen to, very strange. And I used to invite some of the Americans around ,my· 
house and have parties there. And they would come a,nd they·'d. s~y·, thi.s is, the 
enly place you can sit down and really talk to Vietnamese as- people, · in my fiou~:e , 
And yet, they were advisers to the Vietnamese, they· talked to them all the ti'tne , 
And the Vietnamese families would come in and I 1'd say·, why- don it you b:12.:j:ng · your, 
wives· and your .daughters· other places. I dontt see them around tlie other American 
homes. And they said, do y~u see the way they are looking a,t our wornenall the 
tine, And, well, I didntt .. ,I didn 1 t see that nut evidently· wet,re very- lecherous· 
gr0up of men, far from home, you know.-, and qur @wn we:menkina, in a foreign 
p<;:!pula.th:,n to w~rk with them, and I guess there was a lot · eif ,misbehq;vi~,r ~ But 
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L: many times- the leadership for the other side came to my house and admit 
they didn "t have the answer for something and wanted to lo0k for it, and they-
wouldn't do that with the other Americans. And it was good because t could 
say-, well, we make mistakes like that too and this is- the way we did it once 
when we made a mis-take and we discovered this-. , • • , . 
